Author

Yandy Orozco

Date of Award

2017

Type

Thesis

Major

Master of Art in History

Department

History and Geography

Abstract

This research looks at how covert operations in Iran and Guatemala shaped the decision to launch the Bay of Pigs invasion, and why the United States government embarked on an operation that had little chance of success. Key areas of discussion are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its role in the removal of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq (Iran) and President Jacobo Arbenz (Guatemala), the Dulles faction, the anti-Castro program, and President Kennedy’s relationship with the CIA. Upon examining these areas, the study shows that the covert action success in Iran and Guatemala fueled American hubris and obviated the recognition of warning signs, which led to the approval of an operation doomed to fail.

Included in

History Commons

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