

be increasingly useful in the face of Chinese power. The United States has generally encouraged Japan to bolster Russia's democratization and market reforms, but as Washington has grown to doubt Moscow's commitment to those ideals, Tokyo's continued efforts at reconciliation raise some uncertainty. China stands to benefit from better Russo-Japanese relations through a quieter atmosphere in the North, so that it can concentrate on Taiwan, but it is distrustful. In 2000, the summit between North and South Korea made multilateral cooperation more essential, yet Japan's wariness about South Korea's making concessions without stopping the missile threat from North Korea differed from Russia's effort to rebuild ties with North Korea to gain leverage. Hopes for regionalism centered on development of Russian energy resources and resolution of the Korean impasse (both to be accomplished jointly with the United States and China) and on Russia's creating a sound economic and legal framework.

While at times over the past half-century leaders in the Kremlin have harbored hopes of splitting Japan from the United States, they would do well to expect only modest leverage through a more independent Japanese foreign policy in a context of economic globalization. Such leverage would give a boost to Russian aspirations for influence while not interfering with the need to combine the resources of multinational corporations for Russian development. It is up to Russia to foster an environment conducive to Japanese trust and investment.

Over more than three centuries of contact, Japanese and Russians can look back to few periods of sustained cooperation. In the second half of the nineteenth century, both nations turned to the West rather than to each other for models of change and for promising partners. In the first postwar decades, Moscow insisted that its socialist model was applicable to Japan as well as other countries. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, some in Japan proposed that Russia pay less attention to Western free-market ideals and borrow from Japan's state guidance and modified market economy. If comparisons may suggest that a shared preference for collective orientation over individualism could draw these nations together, most observers point instead to the contrasts in thinking: quality-oriented Japanese ways opposed to Russian reliance on quantity over quality; coercive top-down Russian exercise of power versus consensus building in Japanese organizations; and quiet Japanese confidence in continuities with the past unlike the frustrated Russian search for an elusive national identity. Even if the two nations need each other for stability and regional development, they are not likely to turn to each other as models.

Intense negotiations have begun to look beyond the territorial issue toward multilateral relations. Japan and Russia stand at opposite ends of Northeast Asia. Having squeezed China and Korea for many decades, they now face the challenge of economic integration through regionalism and globalization. The geographical reality is that Russia's Far East population is shrinking and now stands at barely 7 million, which Moscow cannot afford to support. Its dispersed natural resources from the northern reaches of eastern Siberia to the Sea of Okhotsk require Japanese investment for development. If Moscow and Tokyo could agree on a program for cooperation, the twenty-first century would proceed with the two sides bringing Northeast Asia together, in contrast to the past century when they split it apart.

Gilbert Rozman

Further Reading

- Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. (1998) *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations*, Vol. 1: *Between War and Peace, 1697-1985*; Vol. 2: *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*. Berkeley, CA: International and Area Studies Research Series, no. 97.
- Kimura, Hiroshi. (2000) *Japanese-Russian Relations under Brezhnev and Andropov: Distant Neighbors*, Vol. 1. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- . (2000) *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin: Distant Neighbors*, Vol. 2. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Rozman, Gilbert. (1992) *Japan's Response to the Gorbachev Era*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rozman, Gilbert, ed. (2000) *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Swearingen, Rodger. (1978) *The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan: Escalating Challenge and Response*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Verbitsky, Semyon, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, and Gilbert Rozman. (2000) *Misperceptions between Japan and Russia*. Pittsburgh, PA: Carl Beck Papers, Center for Russian and East European Studies.

JAPAN-TAIWAN RELATIONS Relations between Japan and Taiwan have ranged from hostility in 1874, to colonial occupation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the current relationship of active commercial trade and diplomacy. Since 1972, official relations have been strained by the international acceptance of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of China, but economic relations have continued and expanded in the face of this difficulty.

Early Contacts

The first significant contact between Japan and Taiwan came when Japan sent a force to Taiwan in 1871 to punish the Taiwanese for the murder of a group of shipwrecked sailors from the Ryukyu Islands. China's foreign ministry accepted responsibility for the actions of the Taiwanese natives and paid an indemnity. In doing so, China asserted its sovereignty over Taiwan and effectively accepted Japan's control over the Ryukyus.

Some twenty years later, following the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, China was forced to cede Taiwan and neighboring islands to Japan, and Taiwan was formally colonized as part of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in 1923. The indigenous Taiwanese population were thus brought into the Japanese empire as subjects (not citizens) and were indoctrinated much as the Korean population was, being forced to adopt Japanese names and wear Japanese clothing. This formal colonization ended with the Japanese defeat in 1945 at the end of World War II, but rather than becoming free Taiwanese the people came under the control of the Nationalist Chinese.

Because the Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek had participated in the Allied Cairo Conference with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill, it fell to his forces to accept the surrender of Japanese forces on Taiwan. Thus the postwar relationship of Japan and Taiwan was between the former imperial power and the Chinese opposition, the former of which had been defeated by the United States, and the latter of which was losing its civil war against the Communists on the Asian mainland. Japan and Taiwan would be guided in the coming decades by the geopolitics between East and West and by the conflicts between Communism and capitalism, as much as by the actions and desires of their home governments.

Role of Communist China

The role of the Chinese Communists shaped Japan-Taiwan relations for the next quarter-century. To counter what it perceived as a monolithic Communist threat, the United States sought to limit the opportunities upon which Moscow or Beijing could capitalize. The U.S. decision to support Chiang over China's Communist leader Mao Zedong was a political one; during World War II the Roosevelt administration had seen fit to ally itself with another Communist (Joseph Stalin), but in the case of China, the U.S. Congress favored Chiang. In any case, following the

retreat of Chiang's forces to Taiwan in 1949, the United States pursued a policy of using its assets in the region to support the Nationalist government. One of those assets was Japan, which was still under U.S. administration at that time. Coincident with this was the need to keep Japan free from Communist influence; the fear of Communism was the dominant factor in Washington's East Asian policy.

The Truman administration (1945-1953) saw the establishment of close trade relationships between Taiwan and Japan as a means to preserve a stable, non-Communist Japan as well as to support the Japan that the United States was trying to develop. For Japan, Taiwan would be a better source of food and raw materials than other Southeast Asian nations such as Myanmar (Burma) or Malaysia. However, despite its desire to trade with Taiwan, Japan also favored ties with Communist China, which had more to offer despite the competing forms of government.

The key to Japan's willingness to trade with a Communist government lies in the Japanese business philosophy known as *seikeibunri*, a contraction for the Japanese words *seiji* (politics), *keizai* (economy), and *bunri* (separation). *Seikeibunri* provided a means of private Japanese business to continue economic ties with Taiwan when Japan and the United States wanted to do otherwise and was the basis for the continuation of these economic ties once diplomatic recognition of Taipei was abandoned. This stance, which came to be known as the Japan formula, explains a great deal of Japan's regional economic success.

The defeat of the Nationalist Chinese in 1949 seemed to the United States to be the harbinger of further Communist successes. Although the U.S. policy of "containing" Communism had called for steady pressure on the Soviet Union in the expectation that Communism would fail from its own flaws, President Harry Truman in mid-May 1950 approved an Asia policy that called for a "rollback" of Communism in China. The need for such a policy was punctuated five weeks later when the Korean War began, even as the Allied powers of World War II were negotiating a peace treaty with Japan.

Despite the Communist invasion of South Korea with its implications for other non-Communist nations in East Asia, not all of America's allies perceived the same degree of threat. In particular, Great Britain was at odds with U.S. policy regarding the two Chinas. London did not see the need for ties with the Nationalists and sought to have Taiwan ceded to the People's Republic of China; the British presence on Hong Kong may have been a motivating factor for this.

The U.S. desire for ties between Japan and Taiwan was fulfilled; by 1951 Japan and Taiwan accounted for about one-third of each other's trade. On the political side, the Japanese prime minister Yoshida Shigeru accepted the U.S. demand that Japan would not make peace with the PRC; for Yoshida, it was more valuable to end the U.S. occupation of Japan than to contest the bases of future Japanese foreign policy. Japan's acceptance of Taiwan over the PRC would contribute to the "two China" view preferred by the United States.

The Japanese position was supposedly laid out in a letter from Prime Minister Yoshida to the U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles. The "Yoshida Letter" (actually written by Dulles) accepted Nationalist rule in Taiwan and was the basis for a bilateral treaty between Tokyo and Taipei that took the place of Chiang's participation in the multilateral peace treaty with Japan. In retrospect, it shows the degree to which regional politics were at the convenience of Washington. This began to change once Japan signed the multilateral peace treaty and regained some degree of independence.

With the peace treaty signed, in 1952 Japan began unofficial trade agreements with the People's Republic of China. By 1956 Japanese trade with China exceeded that with Taiwan.

U.S.-China Policy

The U.S. commitment to Taiwan was formalized in 1954 with the Mutual Defense Treaty. This treaty called for either party to support the other in the event of an attack by hostile forces, but it did allow either side to terminate the treaty after one year's notice. Coming after the Korean War, this treaty remained in effect through the conflict in Vietnam, during which military aid to Taiwan (and other nations in the region) more than doubled.

The Vietnam War led to a change in U.S. policy that was confusing to some and outrageous to others. Despite an ongoing armed conflict with a Communist nation (North Vietnam) supported by other Communist nations (the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China), it became evident that U.S. policies seemed to be softening toward China. At the beginning of July 1971, the U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger met with Taiwan's ambassador, James Shen, to hear Taiwan's objection to the possibility of "dual representation" in the United Nations. The next day Kissinger left on a secret mission to Beijing to discuss a major change in U.S.-PRC relations. Dual representation was a political hot potato on many fronts; it

would also face objection from South Korea and West Germany, due to their Cold War divided status.

A different view was held in Japan. In January 1971 Prime Minister Sato Eisaku announced to the Japanese parliament his desire for closer ties to Beijing. When it became known that the United States was involved in normalization of relations with the PRC, the Japanese response was enthusiastic. However, Japan's minister of foreign affairs did not believe that dual representation would be possible and so advised the U.S. embassy in Tokyo. The United States still sought a means for retaining the status quo with the Nationalist government while moving toward normalizing relations with Beijing, but support for Taiwan was eroding in the United Nations.

Only ten months later, the United Nations accepted the proposal to expel Taiwan; a vote on the U.S. plan for dual representation was not taken. A month later, in February 1972, the U.S. president Richard Nixon and the PRC premier Zhou Enlai issued the Shanghai Communiqué, which in addition to denouncing hegemony in the region declared that Taiwan was an integral part of China. This seemed to be at odds with Nixon's foreign policy report of the same month, which restated the United States's "friendship, our diplomatic ties, and our defense commitment" to Taiwan.

Japan Formula

Japan formally offered diplomatic recognition to the PRC in September 1972. Japan had officially supported Taiwan as long as it was evident that the United States could prevent the PRC government from representing China in the United Nations. When it became evident that the PRC government had enough support to take over China's U.N. seat, Japan no longer supported Taiwan over the PRC. This did not mean that Japan sought to abandon Taiwan as a trading partner; it was just a formal recognition that Japan saw the People's Republic as having the advantage in any competition between the two Chinas.

That month the Japanese prime minister Tanaka Kakuei and Zhou Enlai agreed on essentially the same issues that Nixon and Zhou had. They announced work toward a peace treaty (since the People's Republic had not been a party to the multilateral treaty of 1951), and, most significant, China accepted the Japan formula, allowing continued Japanese trade with Taiwan. This Japan formula called for Japan and Taiwan to shift their relations from governmental to non-governmental organizations. Rather than relying on the familiar governmental entities like the Japanese

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), trade between Tokyo and Taipei would be handled by such agencies as the Association of East Asian Relations in Taipei, the China External Trade Development Council, and the Japanese Interchange Association. Tokyo had too much at stake to give up its investment in Taiwan for better relations with the People's Republic. By 1972 Japan had \$500 million invested in Taiwan, and trade was running at \$800 million a year. The Japan formula provided a win-win-win situation for Japan and the two Chinas: Japan protected its investment, Taiwan got continued trade, and the People's Republic would receive Japanese credit, steel, and technology.

The importance of this Japan formula cannot be overstated, because in addition to allowing Japan to maintain economic relations with both Chinas it made the same thing possible for the United States. When the PRC paramount leader Deng Xiaoping traveled to Japan in October 1978 to sign the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, he hinted that the People's Republic would not object to a similar arrangement with the United States. This led to the eventual agreement that China would not object to continued U.S. economic, trade, and cultural relations with Taiwan, while the United States would recognize the PRC. This, of course, required that the United States withdraw from its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan.

The U.S. decision to end the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan led Congress to pass the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. The ending of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, foreseen for years, led to a new freedom in economic relations. The new order allowed the government in Taiwan to pursue the normal goals of diplomacy with other countries without official recognition or obligation. While lacking the diplomatic status of earlier years (and the forum of the United Nations), Taipei still had "informal offices" internationally through which it could participate in the international arena. Granted, it had to accept less-than-perfect agreements in many cases; nevertheless, it could still participate in the Olympics as "Chinese Taipei" alongside the People's Republic, and it earned membership in the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (alongside the PRC) and the Asian Development Bank.

Enhanced Japan-Taiwan Trade

The Japan formula did not hurt Taiwan's economic relations with Japan; trade continued, although much to Japan's favor. By 1980 Taiwan's trade deficit was \$3.2 billion, with a cumulative \$14.2 billion between

1972 and 1980. This imbalance led to Taiwan's embargoing Japanese goods, which resulted in a Japanese trade mission to resolve the imbalance. Japan reduced its exports to Taiwan briefly, which allowed a later increase in overall exports. This increased trade level continued until 1992.

In the early years of the Taiwan Relations Act, Taiwan and other "trading states" that had developed export-oriented economies along the Japanese model (such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia) pulled away from other developing countries and established themselves in the global market. Between 1985 and 1989, Japan's trade with Taiwan increased threefold, and trends indicated that Japan would replace the United States as Taiwan's major trading partner.

By 1992 Japan's trade with Taiwan reached \$30.7 billion (with Japan running a \$12.9 billion trade surplus). Even as the economic relations between the two nations expanded, relations between Taipei and Beijing developed as well. In 1991 Taiwan and the People's Republic engaged in \$7 billion in trade. Trade between the two Chinas grew during this decade in excess of 10 percent annually, and it stood at over \$22 billion in 1998. The lack of diplomatic ties and restraints has enabled Taiwan and its trading partners to avoid the normal barriers of international trade and has simplified technology transfer between Taiwan and its trading partners.

In 1992 the government in Taiwan changed the name of its trade offices from the Association of East Asian Relations to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office; four of these quasi-consulates are located in the Japanese cities of Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, and Fukuoka. In 1994 MITI posted a minister to Taipei to further legitimize relations. As Taiwan's economy became one of the most prosperous in East Asia, investment became more expensive. This resulted in reduced Japanese imports from and exports to Taiwan, and subsequently Japan expanded investment in the less expensive developing nations in the region, such as Malaysia and Thailand.

As the government of Taiwan has begun to push for broader acceptance as a legitimate government, it has joined many international organizations of which Japan is also a member, including the Pacific Basin Economic Council and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Japan and Taiwan continue to attempt to resolve the trade deficit issue through annual bilateral talks and to establish direct air travel facilities for tourist travel between the two nations. By the

late 1990s, more than 1.5 million passengers and tourists made the trip annually.

Japan's economic involvement with Taiwan has contributed to the success of each and to the detriment of neither. Without the freedom to separate politics from economics, Japan would have been forced to choose sides in the competition between Taipei and Beijing, but *seikeibunri* removed that obstacle. Japan sought the greatest advantage for itself, whether that was to avoid ties with the People's Republic to accommodate the United States as Japan prepared for autonomy in 1951, to establish informal ties with the mainland while holding formal ties with Taiwan, or to reverse the arrangement and continue trade through nongovernmental agencies in Taipei.

Thomas P. Dolan

Further Reading

- Fairbank, John K., Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig. (1989) *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*. Rev. ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Gordon, Andrew, ed. (1993) *Postwar Japan as History*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Johnson, Chalmers. (1995) *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Kim, Young Hum. (1966) *East Asia's Turbulent Century*. New York: Meredith Publishing Company.

JAPAN-UNITED KINGDOM RELATIONS

The history of relations between Japan and Great Britain can be divided into four stages: the beginning of full relations in the mid-nineteenth century, the alliance, interwar, and post-World War II.

Although the first contact between the two nations was in the early seventeenth century, full relations began in the last part of the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868). During the Meiji period (1868–1912), Britain played a major role in the modernization of Japan by helping in the establishment of the Japanese navy and the planning and construction of railroads and factories. Meiji leaders regarded Britain, the pioneer of the industrial revolution, as a model for modern economic and social institutions.

Meiji leaders sought treaty reform as another goal for Japan in its relations with the West. Revision of the Unequal Treaties sought to abolish foreigners' judicial and economic privileges. The Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894 prescribed termination of extraterritoriality, provided that Japan reformed its legal institutions along Western lines. Even though Japan did not get complete tariff autonomy until 1911,

British treaties facilitated negotiations with other Western countries.

Japan and Great Britain were allies during the early twentieth century. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–1923), directed against Russian expansion in the Far East, assisted Japan in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). It was renewed two times, which obligated Japan's participation in World War I as a British ally. After the war, the significance of the Alliance for Britain decreased, and the United States viewed Japan as a strong competitor in East Asia. At the Washington Conference (1921–1922), the United States forced Japan to end the Alliance, which was replaced by the Four Power Pact.

As Japan became an increasingly powerful nation, relations with Great Britain suffered, mainly because of political and economic disputes in Asia, especially trade disputes with China. After the Manchurian Incident of 1931, trade conflict became more intense, and at the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact of September 1940, Japan's ties with Germany and Italy strained relations further still. On 8 December 1941, Japan declared war against Great Britain and the United States, and attacked Britain's colonies in Southeast Asia.

Relations between Japan and Great Britain began to improve after World War II. Britain ratified the Multilateral Peace Treaty in 1952. In the 1960s, new trade treaties were concluded between the two countries. Exchange of royal visits in the 1970s symbolized more open communication between the two nations. Good relations continue in the early 2000s, with exchanges in every sphere.

Hirohisa Yamazaki

See also: Heisei Period; Meiji Period; Showa Period; Taisho Period; World War II

Further Reading

- Brown, Kenneth Douglas. (1998) *Britain and Japan: A Comparative Economic and Social History Since 1900*. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press.
- Buckley, Roger. (1982) *Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States, and Japan, 1945–1952*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Lowe, Peter. (1969) *Great Britain and Japan, 1911–1915: A Study of British Far Eastern Policy*. London: Macmillan.
- Nish, Ian Hill. (1985) *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907*. London: Athlone Press.
- Nish, Ian Hill, and Yoich Kibata, eds. (2000) *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations*. New York: St. Martin's Press.