



The Men or The Mission: Can An Army of Servants Become an Army of Servant Leaders?

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Abstract

This paper evaluates the theory of servant leadership as a viable solution to the Army's sometimes toxic leadership problem. The research question this paper asks is: is servant leadership a viable option for official U.S. Army leadership doctrine? We build the case that while servant leadership is fundamentally incompatible with Army Leadership and is not a viable option for official U.S. Army leadership doctrine, some of the basic tenets of servant leadership are adoptable and adaptable by the U.S. Army. Furthermore, we recommend that the U.S. Army focus on better communicating their existing leadership doctrine throughout the organization rather than revamp it.

Keywords: US Army Leadership Doctrine, Leadership Studies, Military and Veteran Studies, Servant Leadership

Perhaps in no other organization is leadership more important than military formations in combat. Victory on the battlefield is won through coordinated actions across a wide area. Rarely are stories found of heroic actions of a lone soldier that unilaterally impacted a battle. Instead, virtually all combat actions rely on the synergistic forces of fire and maneuver, soldiers supporting soldiers as they try to close with and destroy the enemy. These actions must be controlled by leaders to ensure maximum impact with minimum loss of life. More than the simple issuance of orders or deconfliction of various individual actions however, combat leaders must first convince soldiers to obey them despite the overwhelming risk to their personal safety.

Some may argue that Army leaders have no such need to inspire compliance as U.S. Army soldiers have a codified obligation to obey any lawful general order or regulation. This is not the case. Unlike armies of the past, the United States Army does not employ barrier troops to execute deserters or other soldiers that refuse a direct order. In fact, according to the Army's Uniform Code of Military Justice, the set of laws and regulations that govern all those that serve in the Army, even during times of war, the consequence of refusing to obey a lawful order is a court martial. It is true that the soldier may be sentenced to death for his actions depending on the situation, nevertheless no one, direct supervisor or otherwise, can legally execute that soldier prior to his receiving a trial. This means that something other than fear of immediate retribution must convince that soldier to willingly present himself to mortal risk in accordance with orders (Congress, 2016).

Throughout the history of warfare, combat leaders have struggled with answering this question: what is the most reliable method to influence people in such a way as to command their obedience and loyal cooperation? According to numerous articles, as well as public statements from the department of the Army itself, the US Army still has not cracked this code, as examples of "toxic leadership" can be found across the force (Reed, 2004; Steel, 2011). Toxic leaders are those that are, "abusive and self-aggrandizing, arrogant and petty, and unconcerned about, or oblivious to, staff or troop morale (Zwerdling, 2014)."

The solution to this, some argue, is servant leadership (Wesson, 2013; Farmer, 2010). Conceptualized to be the antithesis of toxic leadership, servant leadership puts the needs of those led first. Although the theory of servant leadership is still nascent compared to other leadership theories, the results from published research are promising. This paper evaluates the theory of servant leadership as a viable solution to the Army's toxic leadership problem.

The research question this paper asks is: is servant leadership a viable option for official U.S. Army leadership doctrine? We build the case that servant leadership is fundamentally incompatible with Army Leadership and is not a viable option for official U.S. Army leadership doctrine. The contemporary discussion of this issue is framed by a larger historical perspective. This is a key part of our current research given that Army leadership development has been a crucial component of military doctrine and

organization since the end of World War II (WWII). Reviewing the evolution of the U.S. Army's leadership doctrine and analyzing the corresponding academic theories that drove its evolution offered us the lens with which to predict what a revised leadership doctrine of servant leadership may look like. Following this preliminary step is an evaluation of how the U.S. Army has, both historically and currently, addressed the dilemma posed by prioritizing the various responsibilities of its leaders. From there, we present a brief overview of the current state of the art of servant leadership. Finally, we conclude with a discussion evaluating the merits of incorporating servant leadership into the existing U.S. leadership doctrine, and derived recommendations thereof are presented.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Formulation and Evolution of the Army's Leadership Model

The "Great Man Theory" of Leadership. Leadership was not directly addressed in U.S. Army doctrine for the majority of its existence. This may be due to the system of purchasing positions of leadership in the very early days, or perhaps due to the prevalent academic theories on leadership centering around hereditary traits in the "Great Man Theory" (Borgatta, Bales, & Couch, 1954). Whatever the cause, in the 1910 edition of the U.S. Army's Field Service Regulations (FSR), the only concepts that address a subject approximating leadership are found in the section addressing the issuance of military orders. Succinctly, the regulation explains that orders "must be loyally and promptly obeyed." Continuing after a description of formatting and substance, the regulation proceeds, "An order should not trespass upon the province of a subordinate...when orders may have to be carried out under unseen circumstances...letters of guidance are preferable." This is interesting to note as it departs from the absolute power model that had been previously painstakingly developed which focused on obedience and discipline as the hallmarks of an efficient unit.

The 1923 revision of the FDSR came after the conclusion of a difficult and bloody experience suffered by the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) during World War I (WWI). Reflecting the lessons learned during the AEF's brutal fight, leadership was, for the first time, cast as a central tenet of the new regulation. A chapter on command was added and the change of language from the previous doctrine was striking. Although leadership itself was not strictly defined, the concept of what the Army values as good leadership was described. Beginning with the remark, "Command and leadership are inseparable" the section proceeds to insist that its commanders take the time to visit with their subordinates to learn, "their accomplishments, their needs, and their views (Hunter, 1963)." After continuing to list the various ways the Army expects its leaders to care for and cherish the Soldiers in their command, it concludes that although an Army leader should be, "considerate and devoted to those whom he commands" he must also, "never hesitate to exact whatever effort is necessary to attain the desired end (Hunter, 1963)."

The next major doctrine would come in 1939. Renamed Field Manual 100-5 (FM 100-5) instead of FSR 1939, leadership was given its own sub chapter and is listed in the table of contents for the first time in Army doctrine. The section, titled “Leadership,” begins not with an explanation of the importance of having orders followed, or advice on how best to develop discipline and obedience within a formation, but with an examination of the psychology of man. The manual claims that the average man in combat is “governed more by instinct than by reason (29).” It continues that his innate “instinct of self-preservation will induce him to flee from danger” (29) but that he may be persuaded to stay and fight if he has been imbued with symbolic ideals or out of a fear of betraying his teammates.

The 1939 manual FM 100-5 continues to belabor the importance of the art of leadership over the science of control when it states that instilling a fear of disobedience in soldiers through threats of retribution is to be resorted to “only in extreme cases” (30) and that “it is far better to dominate demoralizing influences by inculcating in the individual a proper sense of duty, a conscious pride in his unit, and a feeling of mutual obligation to his comrades in the group (30).” When explaining how a leader can develop these traits in soldiers, the manual instructs leaders to live among the men and share in the dangers and privations they face. Suffering or celebrating alongside the soldiers led fosters a sense of comradeship and unlocks the “full combat value” of the unit (32). Furthermore, the manual stresses that good morale and a sense of unity can only be attained if a leader treats all subordinates in a fair and just manner, and above all, demonstrates “a constant concern for the soldier’s welfare (33).”

Following WWII, the U.S. Army doubled-down on the importance of leadership when it published its first manual dedicated only to the subject of leadership. Published in 1948 and simply titled Training Circular No 6: Leadership (TC-6), TC-6 refined the advice and philosophy outlined in the 1939 edition of FM 100-5 into a coherent model and definition of military leadership. TC 6 defined military leadership as, “the art of influencing and directing people to an assigned goal in such a way as to command their obedience, confidence, respect and loyal cooperation (1).” This appears to be an amalgamation of two theories on leadership emerging from the 1920s. The first, presented in 1929 by J.B. Nash posits “leadership implies influencing change in the conduct of people (Bass & Stogdill, 1990; 13).” The second is a definition of leadership developed in a 1927 conference. According to B.V. Moore, who attended the conference, leadership can be defined as, “the ability to impress the will of the leader on those led and induce obedience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation (Gill, 2011; 6).”

Also presented in TC-6 was the Army’s leadership model. The Army’s model likely pulled inspiration from the trait based leadership theorists of its day, including Ordway Tead who presented a similar leadership process in his 1935 work, “The Art of Leadership.” Tead’s model suggested that a good leader should have 10 traits which he described and that the good leader should also employ 8 different techniques. The result of this good leadership, Tead claimed, is the achievement, not just of cooperation towards

a goal, but of a sense of “self-fulfillment and satisfaction on the part of those led (Childs, 1935; 681). The Army’s model, for its part, retained the traits and techniques concept from Tead’s theory, but added its own set of traits and techniques. The Army’s model suggests that good leadership is the result of a leader that understands the 10 principles of leadership, possesses the 12 major leadership traits, and then employs a set of techniques that are different depending on the level of the organization at which the leader currently stands. Interestingly, TC-6 did not include the specific techniques the Army wanted applied at each level (Enlisted, Platoon and Company Officers, Battalion and Regimental Officers, Division Officers and higher). Instead, it explained the plan for integrating leadership specific training into the curriculum of existing soldier training courses at every level (See Figure 1).




Figure 1: Army Leadership Model from 1948

The 10 principles of leadership according to TC-6 are:

1. Know your Job.
2. Know your men and look out for their welfare.
3. Know yourself and seek self-improvement.
4. Keep your men informed.
5. Set the example.
6. See that the task is understood, supervise, and follow through to see that it is carried out.
7. Train your men as a team.
8. Take responsibility for your actions, regardless of their outcome.
9. Seek responsibility and develop a sense of responsibility among subordinates by delegating, supervising, but intervening only when necessary.
10. Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities.

The 12 Major Leadership traits are:

1. Knowledge
2. Judgement
3. Tact
4. Endurance
5. Initiative
6. Bearing
7. Courage
8. Dependability
9. Justice
10. Enthusiasm
11. Integrity
12. Unselfishness

When the Army refined and developed its leadership doctrine in 1951 with the introduction of FM 22-10, it maintained the model as presented in 1948 but attempted to better describe implementation through the use of techniques. These were explained as the specific actions taken by leaders in order to accomplish the principles previously listed. The examples, however, did little to help Army leaders understand the nuances of the model because the examples were painfully specific. The manual attempted to provide leadership techniques for such a numerous and broad spectrum of scenarios that the manual came off as confusing and overwhelming. For example, “what should a leader do when minorities are present?” (“Develop an understanding of minority group problems and feelings by observation and study” [p. 64]) or what should a leader do when in combat? (“Indoctrinate [the soldiers] with the necessity for maintaining the momentum of the attack” [p. 38]). Furthermore, the manual vacillates between leadership theory (“Practice the ‘Golden Rule’ [p. 20]”) and tactical military maxims (“Lack of firepower is uneconomical and must be compensated for by commitment of disproportionate forces [p. 38]”).

In 1953, the Army released FM 22-100. The new manual reintroduced the same leadership model from the previous doctrine, but addressed the weakness of FM 22-10 head on. Instead of attempting to provide example techniques for as many situations as possible, the manual focuses on describing the functioning of the model and a handful of example techniques for each leadership principle. Then, the manual presents a decision-making process and indicators to look for in your formation to determine the success or failure of your leadership techniques. This presents a much more coherent manual from which to understand the Army’s leadership model and even includes case studies of leadership with analyses from combat situations in the appendix.

The Behaviorist Approach to Leadership. The first significant changes to the Army Leadership Model did not appear until the revision of FM 22-100 in 1958. The behaviorist theory of leadership was currently in vogue and was adopted by the Army through its leadership doctrine. Instead of merely stating that leaders are not born but made, an entire chapter is devoted to the explanation of human behavior. This chapter

included steps that soldiers can take in order to develop these behaviors, reiterating that they are not hereditary but learned. The 1958 revision of FM 22-100 included a new model of leadership. Although less clear in respect to the relationship between traits, principles, techniques and indicators, the new model does clarify the mechanism by which leadership affects unit effectiveness and contributes to mission accomplishment (See Figure 2).




Figure 2: Army Leadership Model from 1958

Although additional clarifications and an improved decision-making process were added in the 1961 revision, the Army Leadership Model was not substantially modified again until 1965.

Contingency Leadership. The 1965 edition of the field manual introduced a new leadership theory: that of situational leadership. This edition described the elements of leadership in terms of the leader, the group, and the situation. The manual explains how a group's response to leadership techniques changes in different situations. It suggests a more comprehensive analysis of the various elements will dictate which techniques are feasible to implement. Although clearly a consolidation of various studies and theories, this seems to directly reflect the findings of Feidler's Contingency Theory of Leadership which was published in his 1958 paper, "Leader Attitudes and Group Effectiveness." The section of situational leadership stresses the adaptability of the leader and adds supervision as an element to the model as seen in figure 3, but otherwise does not make any substantive changes to the existing model.

In 1983, the Army released a revised edition of FM 22-100 and did not include a visual model of its leadership framework. Instead, the Army created the concept of "Be, Know, Do." This framework can be found in Appendix A. As a part of this model, the Army included the traits of a good leader, as well as the values and character aspects mentioned in previous doctrine into what a leader must "Be." "Know" includes principles previously espoused as well as knowledge of leadership theories and an understanding of the various elements of leadership. "Do" comprises the actions or techniques a leader employs in order to provide soldiers with the purpose, direction, and motivation necessary to accomplish the mission. The 1990 revision to FM 22-100 continued to refine the new Be, Know, Do Framework. Furthermore, it introduced an additional element to

the contingency portion of the model. Instead of three “elements of Leadership” now the Army had four “factors of Leadership:” the led, the leader, the situation, and communications (44-45).

Transformational Leadership - Important Component of Contingency Leadership. In August of 1999, the Army revised FM 22-100 and renamed the manual, “Army Leadership: BE, KNOW, DO” The Framework itself was virtually unchanged, but the presentation was refined to include a reintroduction of a visual model to describe the concept. The new model demonstrates the relationship between the Army values and its leadership philosophy. Although the new manual omits the “factors of leadership” it does discuss various leadership styles, reflecting the new focus of this model on transformational leadership. Heavily influenced by a 1996 study published by Bernard Bass on the effectiveness of transformational leadership in the Army, the manual describes transactional vs transformational leadership and concludes: “the most effective leaders combine techniques from the transformational and transactional leadership styles to fit the situation” (See Figure 3).




Figure 3: Army Leadership Model from 1999

In 2006, the Army abandoned the Be, Know, Do framework for a model named the Army Leadership Requirements Model (Figure 4). The Army described 12 attributes that determine what an Army leader should be, and the 8 competencies a leader must do. The Manual explains that the most important outcome is “values based leadership” and this is reflected by the reducing of its model into two categories. In short, if an ethical

leader adhering to the Army values exhibits the eight core competencies, he or she is an effective Army leader.




Figure 4: Army Leadership Model from 2006

The most recent revision to the Army leadership doctrine came in 2012 with the introduction of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 (ADRP 6-22) which included a refinement and modification to the Competencies, expanding the number of competencies from eight to ten through the introduction of the competencies “Builds Trust” and “Stewards the Profession” (See Figure 5).




Figure 5: Army Leadership Model from 2012

The Common Thread in Army Leadership Doctrine: The Mission vs. the Men

As can be seen through the development of the Army Leadership Model, the relationship between a commander and his men is of crucial importance. When a conflict between the two priorities arises, which takes precedence, the mission or the men? This is a question with which the Army has wrestled for over 100 years. Prior to the introduction of formal doctrine dedicated to discussing leadership, the answer was implicitly the mission. References to soldiers found in the Army's Field Service Regulations suggest that commanders should view their men as a means to an end. In other words, leadership is important *because* it allows soldiers to be most effective.

In 1951, the Department of the Army made the decision to supersede the 10-page leadership pamphlet that was TC-6 with a 65-page field manual known as FM 22-10. This new manual augmented the information in TC-6 with additional definitions, a discussion of the relationship between leadership and command, and the inclusion of the specific techniques that were noticeably absent from TC-6. Perhaps the most relevant change comes in the first chapter of FM 22-10, where the Department of the Army makes clear the responsibilities of Army leaders: "The primary duty of the leader is the accomplishment of his assigned mission. Everything else, even the welfare of his men, is subordinate (6)." This strong and decisive clarification as to the responsibility of leaders is not matched by anything in TC-6. With this established, the manual then explains that, although a subordinate duty, the leader does have a duty to his men. It had previously explained that a good leader must be concerned with the "desires, needs, and mental state of his men (5)."

Just two years after publishing FM 22-10, the Army published an updated manual with a focus on small unit leaders: FM 22-100. The Army again stated the primacy of the mission accomplishment in respect to a military leader's duties, but this time softened the language substantially and put greater emphasis on the respect of the humanity and innate dignity of soldiers. The next revision FM 22-100 in 1958 further erodes the primacy of the mission with this curious paragraph:

The Commander has two basic responsibilities; accomplishment of his mission, and welfare of his men. These basic responsibilities are of equal importance. However, in the event a conflict arises in the mind of the commander regarding these responsibilities, the mission must take precedence (11).

The inclusion of the preceding paragraph in the 1958 edition is important to note because it marks the first time the Army claimed welfare of soldiers is of equal importance as an end of itself and not merely as a means to mission accomplishment. Three years later, in the 1961 edition, the Army maintains that its leaders have two basic responsibilities. This time, however, the wording expressing the equivalency of the mission and the men has been removed. Instead, the manual states: "of the two, accomplishment of the mission is preeminent. Nevertheless, the leader in accomplishing his mission to the highest degree will always consider the welfare of his men (7)." This

does communicate the message that the men are not merely a means to an end, but it leaves no doubt the hierarchy of responsibility. This sentiment echoes the introduction of the manual which described accomplishment of the mission as the “ultimate objective of military leadership (2).”

The 1965 revision of FM 22-100 may not have updated the definition of leadership, but the discussion of basic leader responsibilities was again updated. ...the commander’s two basic responsibilities [are] the accomplishment of the mission, and looking out for the welfare of the men... In most situations, these two responsibilities are of equal importance. When a conflict exists, accomplishment of the mission must take precedence over the welfare of the men. Even here, however, the leader must consider the manner in which the accomplishment of his mission will simultaneously permit a maximum contribution toward the welfare of his men (6).

In 1983, the Department released a major doctrinal update that included FM 22-100. In the 1983 revision, the Army omitted any direct discussion of the responsibility of Army leaders. In fact, the Army did not include a dedicated section to addressing this dilemma until 2006. Even the section titled, “definition of military leadership” expanded to three paragraphs in the 1983 edition, focuses on a leader’s reflection in his soldier’s eyes. The leadership definition section describes self-serving leaders as ineffective and expounds on what a leader must do to earn the respect of his men. It even goes so far as to say that soldiers sense, “if you are an honorable leader or a self-serving phony who misuses his authority to look good and get promoted (44).” Reading the introduction to the manual, however, reveals a sentence which is telling: “In time of war you must be able to inspire your soldiers to sacrifice self-interest—possibly to sacrifice their lives—to carry out missions for the greater good... (1).” This strongly implies that mission accomplishment is the leader’s highest responsibility. Moreover, this seems to suggest that the manual’s focus on earning the respect of soldiers is a means towards achieving compliance when it counts the most.

In the 1990 revision to FM 22-100, the situation alluded to in the previous introduction was given its own section and labeled, “The Battlefield Challenge: Inspire soldiers to do things against their natural will—to carry out missions for the greater good of the unit, the Army, and the country (1)” Where the 1983 edition focused on welfare of the men as a lens through which to explain the majority of leadership effectiveness, the 1990 edition put substantially more onus on the leader. It directs leaders to “put the nation’s welfare and mission accomplishment ahead of the personal safety of you and your troops (29).” It is stated, however, that the Army will not tolerate self-serving leaders. The leader’s priorities of responsibility can be discerned from the following passage: “As a leader, you must be the greatest servant in your unit. Your rank and position are not personal rewards, you earn them so that you can serve your subordinates, your unit, and your nation (30).” With the prior knowledge that mission is most crucial,

this suggests that the leader should place the welfare of the nation first, and the men and the unit to which they belong, second.

The 1999 edition of FM 22-100 again reevaluated the responsibilities of its leaders. When introducing the concept, the 1990 edition states: “the nation, as well as the members of the Army, hold commanders accountable for accomplishing the mission, keeping the institution sound, and caring for its people (1-14).” This signals a shift once again in the Army’s view of leadership and a return to soldiers as an end in themselves. Expounding on this later in the manual, a crucial pair of questions are posed, but both left unanswered:

Sending soldiers in harm’s way, into places where they may be killed or wounded, might seem to contradict all the emphasis on taking care of soldiers. Does it? How can you truly care for your comrades and send them on missions that might get them killed (3-3)?

Instead of answering either question, the manual recommends readers, “consider this important and fundamental point as you read the next few paragraphs (3-3).” The manual then proceeds to discuss the difficulty in defining the concept of “taking care of soldiers” and recommends difficult realistic training as a means to prepare soldiers for the rigors of combat (3-3). Finally, at the end of the section, the manual explains that soldier’s comforts are important in the maintenance of morale but must take a back seat to the mission before transitioning to a case study from WWII who survived difficult experiences due to the aggressive execution of a tactically sound plan. The very inclusion of the questions highlights the fact that this is an issue with which the Army has wrestled as it codifies its doctrine.

In 2006, the Army revised FM 6-22 and reintroduced a dedicated section to addressing the balance between mission accomplishment and the welfare of soldiers. Interestingly, the Army readdresses the questions posed in 1999. Unfortunately, the manual again fails to provide a substantial response:

Sending Soldiers or civilians in harm’s way to accomplish the mission seems to contradict all the emphasis on taking care of people. How can a leader truly care for comrades and send them on missions that might get them killed? Similarly, when asking junior officers and NCOs to define what leaders do, the most common response is, “take care of soldiers (7-10).

The passage, which included five paragraphs, describes the bond between the leader and the led, the importance of leading from the front and providing for the basic needs of soldiers, as well as investing time to get to know soldiers on a personal level. The final paragraph describes leader’s taking such actions and demonstrating love for his subordinates as, “one way to gain influence and commitment from followers (7-11).” This suggests that the Army has relegated soldiers as a means to accomplishing an end

once again. This supposition is further supported in Chapter 3 of the 2006 edition which describes the roles of Army leaders: “All Army leaders, Soldiers, and Army civilians share the same goals: to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies...by providing effective Army landpower to combatant commanders and to accomplish their organization’s mission in peace and war (3-1).”

The most recent revision to the Army’s leadership doctrine came in August 2012 with the introduction of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22. This manual makes few changes to the Army’s stance on men vs mission. The “Balancing Mission and Welfare” section returned and was virtually unchanged. The question, “How can a leader truly care for comrades and send them on missions that might get them killed?” returned and remains unanswered (6-6). The Army included a summary of the passage in the table which can be seen below (Figure 6). Additionally, the description of taking care of soldiers as a means to “encourage commitment from followers” was retained which supports the conclusion which is that after a century of consideration, the Army maintains that soldier welfare is a crucial means toward the end of mission accomplishment (6-6).

Balances mission and welfare of followers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assesses and routinely monitors effects of mission fulfillment on mental, physical, and emotional attributes of subordinates. • Monitors morale, physical condition, and safety of subordinates. • Provides appropriate relief when conditions jeopardize success of the mission or present overwhelming risk to personnel.
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Figure 3: The U.S. Army's Balancing Mission & Welfare Doctrine

The State of the Art of Servant Leadership

Servant leadership is a leadership theory introduced by Robert Greenleaf in his 1970 essay, “The Servant as Leader (Greenleaf, 1970).” Presented as more of a philosophy for leaders to adopt rather than a definite leadership model to employ, a servant leader is best described as a leader that is servant first, in that he or she wishes to serve, and accepts the mantle of leader as a means of doing so. The theory has grown in popularity since the 1970s and various theorists have more narrowly defined the concept of servant leadership as well as developing various models for its implementation.

In fact, the definition and model of servant leadership, has proven to be elusive. So much so, that numerous papers have been published attempting to determine a definition and model with which to enable empirical research. Unfortunately, there remains no consensus within the servant leadership community of one definition or definitive model (van Dierendonck, 2011). For our analysis, the definition of servant leadership used will be that of Jim Laub which is widely accepted: “Servant leadership is an understanding and practice of leadership that places the good of those led over the self-interest of the leader (Laub, 2004; 3).”

With servant leadership thus defined, it’s necessary to choose a proper servant leadership framework which could potentially be applied to the Army. Larry Spears’

“Ten Characteristics of a Servant Leader” are generally regarded as “the essential elements of servant leadership (van Dierendonck, 2011; 1231).” Although there are various other tools for describing servant leadership, Spears’ characteristics provide an adequate basis from which to explore the concept of servant leadership for the purpose of our analysis. Spears’ ten characteristics of servant leadership are: listening, empathy, healing, awareness, persuasion, conceptualization, foresight, stewardship, commitment to the growth of people, and building community (Spears, 2010).

Numerous studies have been conducted and published attempting to determine the discriminate validity of servant leadership. Among the most common theories with which servant leadership is compared is transformational leadership (Barbuto & Wheeler, 2014; Stone, Russell, & Patterson, 2004; van Dierendonck, 2011; Peterson, Galvin, & Lange, 2012; Parolini, Patterson, & Winston, 2009). In each of these studies it was determined that servant leadership is a distinct leadership theory which is not merely a different application of an existing other leadership theory. The study conducted by Paterson and her colleagues in 2012 found that servant leadership accounted for, “firm performance over and beyond transformational leadership (Peterson et al., 2012).”

Furthermore, there appears to be a consensus among scholars in the field that although servant leadership and transformational leadership have “relatively analogous characteristics” they are decidedly different theories (Stone et al., 2004). The difference, it was decided, is in the focus of the leader (van Dierendonck, 2011). In servant leadership, the ultimate focus of the leader is on the subordinates themselves (Stone et al., 2004). The organization itself or its ends do not matter outside of the context of the subordinate’s welfare. In other words, a servant leader’s investment in the pursuit of organizational goals is incidental to their investment in the employees themselves. If the company fails, the employees will lose their income, etc. Conversely, with a transformational leader, employees are developed as a means to achieving organizational goals (van Dierendonck, 2011).

DISCUSSION

The Army Requirements Model, as we have seen, was deeply influenced by various leadership theories throughout its development. The most recent revisions heavily reflected the characteristics and models of transformational leadership. As a result of the similar qualities shared between transformational and servant leadership, Spears’ characteristics of servant leadership can already be seen represented within the leadership attributes and competencies found in existing Army doctrine. Appendix A demonstrates this with included passages from the corresponding references.

As previously discussed, the Army has adjusted its leadership doctrine to account for lessons learned through analysis of its own experiences during times of war, as well as to incorporate the growing body of research conducted in both the civilian and military sectors which suggest most effective leadership practices and models. This paper also

explored the Army's endeavor to reconcile the dual responsibilities of its leaders, the welfare of the men vs the accomplishment of the mission. It has been seen that after actively contemplating the subject, the Army has determined that the mission must come before the welfare of soldiers. When considering the overall mission of the U.S. Army is, "to fight and win our Nation's wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict (Army, 2017)," this decision makes sense. The Army's doctrine has correctly contented for decades that it is unrealistic to assume that leaders in combat will not be forced to make tough decisions in regard to their soldier's wellbeing.

Soldiers in combat exist to "close with and destroy the enemy" in pursuit of our nation's interests (Headquarters, 2016; 1-19). These interests can prove to be the combat of an existential threat, but as von Clausewitz once said, war can just as likely be a "continuation of **state policy** by other means (von Clausewitz, 1940; 8)." In such a situation, it is difficult to understand how a servant leader could rationalize ordering his soldiers to take an action that could mean certain death. Such scenarios are not merely hyperbole. Consider Major General "Black Jack" Pershing ordering his soldiers into battle on the western front of WWI. He could have had no doubt that numerous of his soldiers would not survive the month, yet the mission demanded it. If a Platoon Leader that day had been a servant leader, what would have been the rationale? The war was fought for dubious reasons, but the U.S. Army was given its orders (Joll, 1999). Could the platoon leaders ordering his soldiers "over the top" and into the teeth of the German machine guns be a servant leader?

The Army tried to rationalize some way to reword or reconsider the realities of war in order to develop a leadership model that placed the welfare of its soldiers on an equal footing with the execution and attainment of organizational goals. It failed. Although a noble ambition, the terrible nature of war necessitates the willing expenditure of human lives. In the words of Benjamin Franklin, "there has never been, nor ever ever be, any such thing as a good war, or a bad peace (Franklin, 1817; 107)." War will always be a bad deal for soldiers. Soldiers' lives are risked in pursuit of national objectives. This extreme price being paid necessitates an absolute premium on those objectives being attained. To fail the mission is to relegate the sacrifice worthless.

As demonstrated throughout this paper, the Army has inculcated the majority of the characteristics found in servant leadership theory. A servant leader reading Army leadership doctrine would be struck by the time and effort spent ensuring Army leaders understand the enormous responsibility placed upon their shoulders in regards to taking care of soldiers. Soldiers are the husbands and wives, sons and daughters of ordinary citizens. With the Selective Service System still in place, it is important to remember that Army leaders may be tasked with leading soldiers that never volunteered for the horror to which they are subjected. Although every effort should be made to accomplish the mission at minimum cost to human life (as the doctrine repeatedly stresses) it would be disingenuous to modify Army doctrine to incorporate servant leadership in its entirety as

a result of the fundamental impossibility of shifting leader focus off of the mission, and onto the best interest of its soldiers.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the Army refrain from replacing existing Army leadership doctrine with a servant leadership model. With that said, there may be ways in which the existing model can be modified to reflect the growing body of evidence that servant leadership can improve various aspects of firm performance. Already Army doctrine contains phrasing and concepts found in servant leadership theory and more research is needed to determine the advantages of continuing to adjust the existing model. A study which tests the effectiveness of Army leaders that are taught and indoctrinated with the attributes and competencies as they are currently written vs Army leaders that execute the current doctrine rewritten to reflect servant leadership more closely could prove useful. For example, instead of merely describing active listening as a necessary antecedent to “building trust,” perhaps introducing active listening as a standalone competency could help leaders better model servant leader type behaviors.

More useful, perhaps, would be to better implement the existing doctrine. The “toxic leaders” mentioned in the introduction do exist within the Army ranks today. We posit that their existence is not due to substantial weaknesses in the Army’s leadership model, but rather in the failure of the Army to reward desired behaviors, attributes, and outcomes. To quote FM 22-100, “As a leader, you must be the greatest servant in your unit. Your rank and position are not personal rewards, you earn them so that you can serve your subordinate, your unit, and your nation (1990, 30).” Although the Army has incorporated practices associated with servant leadership such as the inclusion of 360 assessments on its leaders, command climate considerations are not considered as a prerequisite for promotion neither are they incorporated into soldier evaluation reports. This fails to reward leaders of the type the Army has determined it wants and instead rewards only management outcomes versus leadership ones (Wilke, 2016).

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Characteristics of Servant Leadership (Spears, 2010)	Army Leadership Attribute/Competency (ADRP 6-22, 2012)
<p>Listening The servant leader seeks to identify the will of a group and helps to clarify that will. He or she listens receptively to what is being said and unsaid. Listening also encompasses hearing one’s own inner voice.</p>	<p>Builds Trust Leaders should utilize meaningful communication among involved parties to inquire, acknowledge, and advocate while demonstrating active listening and understanding while shaping perceptions and emotions of all parties</p>
<p>Empathy The servant leader strives to understand and empathize with others. People need to be accepted and recognized for their special and unique spirits.</p>	<p>Empathy Army leaders show empathy when they genuinely relate to another person’s situation, motives, and feelings. Empathy allows the leader to anticipate what others are experiencing and to try to envision how decisions or actions affect them.</p>
<p>Healing Servant leaders are adept at healing others as well as themselves. They help make others whole by facilitating the healing of broken spirits.</p>	<p>Leads Others A commander’s primary responsibility for unit sustainment is to ensure the readiness, health, morale, welfare, and discipline of the unit. Every leader has a role in supporting that responsibility. Leaders must identify at-risk Soldiers, mitigate their stress, and intervene to help them.</p>
<p>Persuasion The servant leader seeks to convince others, rather than coerce compliance</p>	<p>Leads Others Commitment generally produces longer lasting and broader effects. Whereas compliance only affects a follower’s behavior, commitment reaches deeper—changing attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. One caution is that punishment should be used sparingly and only in extreme cases because it can lead to resentment.</p>
<p>Conceptualization The leader who wishes to also be a servant leader must stretch his or her</p>	<p>Prepares Self Understands the contribution of concentration, critical thinking,</p>

thinking to encompass broader-based conceptual thinking.

Foresight

Foresight is a characteristic that enables the servant leader to understand the lessons from the past, the realities of the present, and the likely consequence of a decision for the future.

Stewardship

CEO's, staffs, and trustees all played significant roles in holding their institutions in trust for the greater good of society.

Commitment to the growth of People

The servant leader is deeply committed to the growth of each and every individual within his or her organization. The servant leader recognizes the tremendous responsibility to do everything in his or her power to nurture the personal and professional growth of employees and colleagues.

Building Community

The servant leader seeks to identify some means for building community among those who work within a given institution.

Awareness

General awareness, and especially self-awareness, strengthens the servant-leader

imagination, and problem solving in different task conditions.

Gets Results

Leaders should provide guidance from both near-term and long-term perspectives; Leaders need to encourage a performance improvement mindset that allows for conformity but goes beyond meeting standards to strive for increased efficiencies and effectiveness

Stewards the Profession

Leaders serving as good stewards have concern for the lasting effects of their decisions about all of the resources they use and manage. Stewardship requires prioritization and sacrifice.

Develops Others

Leaders will fully support available developmental opportunities, nominate and encourage subordinates for those opportunities, help remove barriers to capitalize on opportunities, and reinforce the new knowledge and skills once they return. The Army creates positive learning environments at all levels to support its lifelong learning strategy.


Creates a Positive Environment

Leaders establish a climate consistent with the culture of the institution. Leaders use the culture to let members of the organization know they are part of something bigger than just themselves.

Prepares Self

leaders must be able to formulate accurate self-perceptions, gather feedback on others' perceptions, and change their self-concept as appropriate. Being self-aware ultimately requires leaders to develop a clear, honest picture of their capabilities and limitations.

Appendix A: Comparison of Servant Leadership to ARLM



Appendix B: U.S. Army Leadership Doctrine Revision Timeline